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Judgmental Inference:
A Theory of
Inferential Decision-Making During Understanding
ABSTRACT
In the course of understanding a text, a succession of
decision points arise at which readers are faced with the
task of choosing among alternative possible interpretations
of what they're reading. Careful analysis of a wide range
of sample texts reveals that such decisions are often based
on complex evaluations of the interpretation being
constructed, and sometimes cause the reader to construct and
discard a.number of intermediate inferences before settling
on a final interpretation for a text.
This paper introduces Judgmental Inference theory as a
proposed scheme of evaluation metrics and mechanisms,
derived from examination of inference decisions arising
during text understanding. A series of programs, ARTHUR,
MACARTHUR and JUDGE are described, which incorporate some of
the metrics and mechanisms of Judgmental Inference, enabling
them to understand texts more complex than those that can be
handled by other understanding systems.
1.0 Introduction
Many national newspapers carried front-page versions of
the following story early this year:
[1] A Nicaraguan soldier, who last year made a public
statement alleging Cuban, Ethiopian and Nicaraguan
military aid to Salvadorian leftist guerrillas, today
publicly retracted his story at a State Department news
conference.
Why did the Nicaraguan soldier make the statements he made,
a year ago and now? Why did the State Department hold these
two news conferences? it is possible that the State
Department had some reason for holding the news conference,
intending the Nicaraguan soldier to recant; but most
readers assume that the State Department had different
intentions that were not fulfilled, for reasons out of their
control. Indeed, most readers don't even consciously think
of the former interpretation, even though it is a logical
possible alternative explanation of the events.
Texts describing complex situations like this often
face readers with implicit choices among a number of
alternative interpretations; and even apparently simple
examples often present similar difficult decision points to
an understander. Consider for instance;
This research was supported in part by the Naval Ocean
Systems Center under contract N00123-81-C-1078.
[2] Kathy and Chris were playing golf. Kathy hit a shot
into the rough. She wanted to let her good friend
Chris win the game.
Most readers assume that the reason Kathy hit her shot into
the rough was to increase her opponent's chances of winning,
out of friendship. However, consider the following:
[3] Ken and Carl were playing golf. Ken hit a shot into
the rough.
Most readers assume that Ken's shot waS simply an accident,
not intentional at all. However, this story is entirely
identical to the first two sentences of [2] above. Hence,
if a reader has made any inference at all by the time those
two sentences of [2] have been read, then that inference is
that Kathy's shot too was probably an accident. Yet by the
end of the third sentence of [2], virtually no readers ever
assume that interpretation.
Careful analysis of examples like these clearly
indicate the existence of decision points at which human
understanders are faced with the task of choosing particular
inferential paths from among an array of possible
alternatives. Our analysis shows that these inference
decisions are based on complex evaluation metrics for
judging the appropriateness of a particular inference in
light of the context of previous inferences; textual and
extra-textual factors influencing such decisions; and
mechanisms for gonstCWCtipg and revising interpretations
during understanding.
This paper introduces Judgmental Inference theory,
which proposes a set of evaluation metrics and mechanisms
derived from examination of inference decisions arising
during text understanding. A series of programs are
described which incorporate some of the metrics and
mechanisms of judgmental inference; ARTHUR and MACARTHUR
are working systems capable of understanding texts more
complex than those that can be handled by other
understanding systems, (e.g., PAM [Wilensky 1979], frump
[DeJong 1980], Ms.Malaprop [Charniak 1979], IPP [Lebowitz
1981]}; and JUDGE, still under construction, incorporates a
more integrated approach to judgmental inference than its
two predecessors.
These theories are intended to be judged not only as
working computer systems, but also as hypotheses about how
people cope with inference decisions during understanding.
Towards that end, some psychological and neurophysiological
experiments are being designed to enable us to compare our
theory's predictions with data on human understanders'
inference behavior.
We view this work as compatible with and complementary
to riesearch that focuses primarily on representational
issues in text understanding, such as Schank and Abelson
[1977], Wilensky [1980], Charniak [1980]. By examining the
occurrences of inference decisions during understanding, we
intend to provide a look at the mechanisms by which such
representations are chosen, constructed, judged, confirmed
and/or discarded during the processing of a text.
Following is an overview of the organization of the
rest of this paper:
Section 2 presents analyses of some illustrative
examples, thereby introducing some major categories of
decisions a reader is faced with during understanding, and
the evaluation metrics upon which such decisions are based.
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Section 3 gives some examples of question-answering
output from two working computer systems called ARTHUR and
m MACARTHUR, which use judgmental inference processes to
successfully make inference decisions presented by these
examples.I
H Section 4dicusses additional metrics and mechanisms of
Judgmental Inference which have been derived from more
complex examples than the previous sections have shown.
These are being incorporated into the design of the JUDGE
program.
I
I
® Section 5summarizes the current state of the research
I so far, and speculates on some potential implications of
this work for the areas of cognitive psychology and
m neurophysiology.
I
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2.0 Illustrations of Understanders' Decisions
2.1 Evaluating and supplanting inferences
Recall the two "golf" stories given above:
[2] Kathy and Chris were playing golf. Kathy hit a shot
into the rough. She wanted to let her good friend
Chris win the game.
[3] Ken and Carl were playing golf. Ken hit a shot into
the rough.
Let us examine in more detail the difficulties encountered
by a reader of these examples. After reading the
two-sentence version [3], readers infer that Ken and Carl
both were playing to win, and that Ken's bad shot therefore
was accidental, and will hinder his goal of winning the
game. These inferences about Ken's intentions can be
schematically illustrated as follows;
Inferences
Statements
K wants to K accidentally
win the game. made a bad shot.
C wants to
win the game,
I
K and C are
playing golf.
(hinders goal)
K hit to rough,
[Figure 1]
However, after readers have read the third sentence that
appears in version [2], they appear to have changed this
initial interpretation a great deal. It is not just that
IKathy doesn't want to win the game after all, but also that
therefore she most probably made her bad shot on purpose,
not accidentally. Virtually all readers arrive at this
interpretation by the end of this example, by supplant-ina
some of their initial inferences by new ones (see Granger
[1980]).,
2.2 The evaluation metrics of cohesion and parsimony
Why do people arrive at this different interpretation
about Kathy's action in this example? The answer is far
from obvious. In particular, there is no question of
I logical consistency here; once the initial inference about
her goals has been supplanted then the interpretation is
already entirely logically consistent. That interpretation,
I shown in Figure [2] below, would be that Kathy's bad shot
was still simply an accident, even though it will help what
I we now know to be her goal of losing the game.
II
I
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Inferences:
Statements:
\ /
\ /
K wanV to
win /\e game.
/ \ ^ I
/ \ I- _ \ / _1
(hinVrs goal)
C wants to /\
win the game. / \
K and C are
playing golf.
K accidentally
made a bad shot.j
(helps goal)
K hit to rough.
[Figure 2]
K wants to
lose the game,
K wants C to
win the game.
However virtually no readers ever arrive at this
interpretation of this example; they all do the
(unconscious) extra work of also supplanting the inference
about K's bad shot; i.e., inferring that it was
intentional, not accidental;
Inferences:
Statements:
K intentionally
made a bad shot.
A
\ / \ / l_ _
\ / \ /
K wan\/ to K ac\/dentally
win /\e game. made/\ bad shot
/ \ " \ / I / \
/ \ l_ _\/ _!/ \
(hi/\dr)
C wants to / \
win the game. /
K and C are
playing golf.
K hit to rough,
[Figure 3]
(in service I
of goal) I
V
K wants to
lose the game,
K wants C to
win the game.
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It turns out that the scope of this phenomenon is very
I wide: people often arrive at interpretations that appear to
involve the supplanting of initial inferences, even when
that extra work is not necessary on grounds of logical
consistency. For instance, consider the following two
examples:
[4] Doug went to a gas station. He robbed it and got away
with $50.
[5] Mary picked up a magazine. She swatted a fly.
I These are both examples, like [2] and [3] above, in which
the most likely initial inferences (Doug was going to get
gas for his car at the gas station; Mary was going to read
the magazine) are supplanted by the time the reader has
finished the example. (Again, this can easily be
H demonstrated by giving just the first sentences to readers
and observing that they never infer that Doug might intend
to rob the station, nor that Mary might intend to use the
magazine as a fly swatter; a series of controlled protocol
experiments along these lines is described in Rumelhart
[1981]).
Again, these texts do not give rise to any logical
contradictions, but they nonetheless imply initial
I inferences that human readers seem to eventually reject by
the time they have finished reading the text. The decision
to reject an initial inference, then, must depend on an
evaluation of the representation based on some metric other
II
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than logical consistency.
One such evaluation metric that was (implicitly)
incorporated into previous theories of inference generation
we have termed the "cohesion metric". Slightly differing
versions of this measure of text representations have
variously been referred to as "consistency" of
interpretation (Rumelhart [1981]), "causal connectedness"
(Schank [1973]), and "coherence" (Crothers [1978], Bower,
Black and Turner [1979], Black [1980]). All of these
hypotheses about text representations essentially say that
the inferential net composing the representation must
contain connections tying together all of the statements in
text, via either referential, causal or intentional
connective inferences. As Rumelhart [1981] puts it;
"... the problem facing a comprehender is
analogous to the problem that a detective faces
when trying to solve a crime. In both cases there
are a set of clues. The listener's (or reader's)
job is to find a consistent interpretation of
those clues." [p.30]
The cohesion metric therefore requires that every statement
in a text be connected to at least one other, resulting in
all the pieces of the text representation being tied
together in a consistent fashion.
Cohesion by itself is not sufficient to evaluate the
goodness of a text representation, however. Another
evaluation metric, identified in our previous work (Granger
[1980]), measures the parsimony of a representation, with
II
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respect to the goals that motivate the events in the text.
For instance, example [4] above could be interpreted in
either of the following two ways;
(a) John went to the gas station intending to get gas,
and then he changed his mind and decided to rob
the station instead;
(b) John went to the gas station intending to rob it.
Both of these interpretations are not only logically
consistent, but also referentially cohesive, since the actor
(John) and the location (the gas station) were the same for
both story statements under either interpretation.
Furthermore, both interpretations are causally cohesive,
since John had to get to the gas station before he could rob
it, regardless of his intentions in performing those
actions. Therefore, the cohesion metric does not
differentiate between these two alternative interpretations,
but people do: they universally seem to generate
interpretation (b), and in fact they rarely even think of
the possibility of (a) until it is pointed out to them.
Similarly, the following are all logically consistent
and referentially and causally cohesive interpretations of
example [5]:
12
(5a) Mary picked up a magazine to read it. She
then was annoyed by a fly, and she swatted it
with the magazine she was holding.
(5b) Mary picked up a magazine to read it. she
then was annoyed by a fly, and she swatted it
with a flyswatter that was handy.
(5c) Mary picked up a magazine to swat a fly with
it.
The last interpretation (5c) reflects a story representation
which consists of a single goal, getting rid of a fly, which
both of Mary's actions were performed in service of. The
other interpretations both consist of two separate goals,
each of which explains one of Mary's actions. The
evaluation metric of parsimony essentially tests that an
interpretation be maximally parsimonious with respect to the
number of goals used to explain the events in the story;
i.e., the fewer separate motives inferred to account for the
story events, the better.
2.3 Some related work, briefly contrasted
It is important to note that the evaluation metrics of
cohesion and parsimony completely differentiate Judgmental
Inference theory from the paradigm of "truth maintenance"
(Doyle [1978, 1979], McDermott and Doyle [1980]). The
theories behind truth-maintenance systems are concerned with
the problem of maintaining a logically self-consistent
database of propositions. Based on this notion, the various
interpretations presented for the examples above (e.g., gas
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station [4], fly swatting [5], golf [2],[3]) would all be
considered equally self-consistent, since no explicit
contradictions occur in any of these interpretations. The
problem of course is that human readers universally select
certain of these interpretations over the others, and in
fact seem never to consciously notice other possible
interpretations at all. The cohesion and parsimony metrics
were developed to account for this observed preference.
The overall notion of making evaluations for goodness
of fit and seeking alternatives when indicated by the
evaluation is similar in spirit to the standard Artificial
Intelligence notion of searching through a state-space, and
such search techniques are covered in most AX textbooks.
Those techniques do not apply to the problem of text
understanding, however, for several reasons. The typical AI
state-space represents a world of information that is
simple, consistent, and correct (e.g., the domains of
logical propositions or games such as chess, see Nilsson
[1971]). The procedures for adding new information are
well-defined theorems or rule-systems (e.g., production
systems, see Newell and Simon [1972] or Winston [1977]).
The evaluation metrics ("static evaluations") found in many
search programs are numerical, making comparisons easy (see
Barr and Feigenbaum [1981]). These programs focus on
problem-solving skills and domain expertise. They seek
alternatives by backing up, either in a timeless world (as
in theorem-proving programs) or by reversing time (as in
14
many planning systems).
In contrast, the world of understanding actual text and
human intentionality is complex and often inconsistent or
incorrect (particularly where beliefs are concerned). First
of all, time cannot simply be "reversed" in a cognitive
model, the way it can in a mathematically-based
problem-solving system; we cannot "unread" a piece of text.
The strategies for seeking alternatives in our model must be
psychologically more plausible than a mechanical scheme.
Secondly, new information is added to an inference net by
means of inference rules and inference contexts such as
plans and goals, and hence the evaluation, metrics described
here are inherently non-numerical. Finally, the processes
involved in understanding texts like those in this paper are
dependent on knowledge of very different domains than those
of traditional problem-solving systems, e.g., knowledge
about social interactions, affective reactions to plan
failures, and other instances of human intentionality in
everyday situations,
2.4 The scope of the problem
As pointed out earlier, many texts ranging from
iapparently simple to complex give rise to complications in
the understanding process, often requiring evaluation and
re-evaluation of the constructed interpretation. So far, we
have focused on an analysis of a few deceptively simple
15
examples, the "gaS-station" story, "fly-swatting", and
"golf". In general any similar "garden-path" text, i.e.,
one which gives rise to initial inferences that fail to be
substantiated as the text continues, will present very
similar processing difficulties tO an understander.
Following are a couple of additional examples; as before,
to see the difficulty of processing them, imagine a question
about whv the actor did the first action, being asked
initially after the first sentence and then again at the end
of the example:
1. Collette picked up her sheet music. She began to fan
herself.
2. Carl picked up the newspaper. He wanted to get his
tennis raquet that was underneath it.
Additional (and more obvious) examples are those in which an
understander expresses surprise at the ending of the
example, having apparently consciously noticed the
construction of the intermediate interpretation, that was
subsequently supplanted. This subcategory of garden-path
texts includes those that contain "surprise endings", jokes,
and mysteries:
1. A man came to Ed's door, saying he wanted to talk to Ed
about some insurance policies, Ed let the man in, and
then the man pulled a knife and ordered Ed to give him
all his money.
2. "I took my wife to the Bahamas, but then she found her
way back home."
II
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3. Willy North went into the Roger Sherman movie theater.
He went up to the balcony, where Geoff was waiting!
Geoff pulled out an ounce of cocaine and handed it to
Willy, Willy paid him in hundred-dollar bills and left
quickly.
Note that this last set of examples of garden-path
texts tends to cause readers to express conscious surprise
at the ending of the story, whereas the first set of texts
seemed not to cause this kind of surprise. So far we have
II only tentative hypotheses to account for why some texts
cause conscious surprise and others cause only this
"unconscious surprise". We are working on a theory of
"loose end" inferences that we hope will provide part of an
answer, and we are designing some experiments that we hope
will shed some light on the question.
2.5 Shaping interpretations of behavior
We have identified some further evaluations that
understanders perform, beyond cohesion and parsimony, which
arise when a reader is led to "doubt" any part of his
I interpretation of a text. Suoh doubts can be instilled
either by information presented in the text, or by
"extra-textual" factors (see Granger [1981]) which may steer
the reader away from an otherwise plausible interpretation.
Examples of such "doubt-factors" include the reader's
knowledge of the reliability of the text source (e.g., the
between the New York Times and the National
17
Enquirer); knowledge of an actor's deviousness (e.g., a car
salesman vs. a priest); relative boredom or interest, i.e.,
the reader's desire to pursue possible alternative
interpretations vs. just settling on a default
interpretation that's "good enough". An easy way to induce
a doubt factor in a reader is to simply tell him that his
initial interpretation is incorrect; i.e., explicitly ask
for a new and different interpretation of a text.
It turns out that readers are very capable of producing
a series of such alternative interpretations of texts when
they're Continually told their initial interpretation is
incorrect. For instance, following is a story adapted from
a newspaper text, along with a series of interpretations
informally elicited from a subject;
[6] The Pakistani ambassador to the United States made an
unscheduled stop in Albania on his way home to what an
aide of the ambassador described as "a working
vacation".
Ql) Why did the ambassador go to Albania?
Al) It looks like he was on vacation — he went to
Albania first and then to home, I guess in Pakistan.
Q2) No, that's not the real reason. Why did he go to
Albania?
A2) Well, maybe there was some emergency reason ... it
said it was unscheduled, so maybe it was that
something went wrong and they had to stop there, and
then they went on.
Q3) Still not it, but try again; why did he go to
Albania?
A3) Ok, maybe, well he's an ambassador, so he could have
been supposed to go to Albania ... so it could have
been a meeting, like "shuttle diplomacy" ... but it
was supposed to be a secret, so that's why they said
it was unscheduled.
18
These different interpretations of [6] are each based
on different interpretations of the actor's reasons for
doing what he did. It is natural that different behavior
interpretations should give rise to different text
interpretations; most current theories of text
representation focus primarily on representation of the
events described in the text, rather than on a more
"syntactic" analysis of the structure of the text itself.
Our analysis of this and similar examples has revealed
a large class of inference evaluations people perform based
on their attempts to decide what kind of behavior an actor
has performed, for instance;
1. "simple" goal pursuit, e.g., "John was hungry, so he ate
a hamburger";
2. "complex" goal pursuit, (i.e., goal interactions; see
Wilensky [1979]) — e.g., "John wanted to see the
football game but he also had a paper due the next day"
(goal conflict);
3. deceptive or intentionally misleading behavior, e.g.,
"Clark wanted Lois to think he was drunk, so he smiled
and fell off the barstool onto the ground";
4. accidental (non-goal-directed) behavior, e.g., "Jack
smiled and fell off the barstool onto the ground"(1);
5. impromptu reactions to unplanned-for contingencies,
e.g., "Bill threw himself under the jeep when he saw the
man pull a gun".
(As suggested by some of the above examples, it will often
be quite difficult or impossible for an understander to
"correctly" place an actor's behavior into just one of these
categories. This issue is discussed further in Section 4.)
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We have devised a classification scheme for dividing up
the gamut of possible interpretations of behavior, first
dividing it into intentional vs. unintentional, and then
further subdividing intentional behavior into simple,
deceptive, pre-planned, impromptu, etc.; and unintentional
or accidental behavior into various types of failures such
as skill failure, information failure, etc.
Figure [4] illustrates the current state of our
classification scheme for behaviors. We call each leaf of
this tree an interpretation-"shape", since placing an
actor's behavior at a particular leaf will result in a
particular shape of the representation graph constructed,
and because re-interpreting an actor's behavior results in
re-shaping the representation. The next section will show
some output of computer programs that use knowledge of
cohesion, parsimony and interpretation shapes to construct
interpretations of texts and to re-shape those
interpretations when continually re-questioned about them.
Intentional
Behavior
Behavior
Non-intentional
Behavior
Pre-planned
Improiptu
simple
intentions corplex
Intentions
duplicity
(goal (cover-
interactions) stories)
avoidance of
ritual
(scripty)
undesired state
pursuit of
desired state
contingency
planning
autonomic
(involuntary)
affective
response
interruptions
re-planning
re-acting
skill
failure
planning
failure
("too-shallow"
planning)
system
failure
(instrument)
Irrational
Behavior
information
failure
attention
failure
("autopilot")
to
o
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3.0 Judgmental Inference Systems in Action
3.1 ARTHUR changes its mind about its own inferences
ARTHUR uses the evaluation metrics of cohesion and
parsimony, and the mechanisms of prediction and supplanting,
to monitor its own progress through a text and arrive at the
same interpretations of simple texts that people do. ARTHUR
illustrates its understanding by answering questions about
what it has read, including in its answers both its final
interpretation and any intermediate interpretations that it
had to discard (supplant) along the way. Following are the
output from some sample question-answering sessions with
ARTHUR on examples discussed above:
STORYl: Doug went to the gas station. He robbed it.
Q) Why did Doug go to the gas station?
A) AT FIRST I THOUGHT IT WAS BECAUSE HE WANTED TO GET
SOME GASOLINE, BUT ACTUALLY IT'S BECAUSE HE WANTED
TO GO THERE TO STEAL MONEY.
ST0RY2: Mary picked up a magazine. She swatted a fly.
Q) Why did Mary pick up the magazine?
A) AT FIRST I THOUGHT IT WAS BECAUSE SHE WANTED TO READ
IT, BUT ACTUALLY IT'S BECAUSE SHE WANTED TO USE IT
TO GET RID OF A FLY.
22
STORYS: Kathy and Chris were playing golf, Kathy hit her
ball into the rough. She wanted to let Chris win.
Q) Why did Kathy hit her ball into the rough?
A) AT FIRST I THOUGHT IT WAS ACCIDENTAL, BUT ACTUALLY IT
WAS ON PURPOSE BECAUSE SHE WANTED TO LOSE THE GAME.
ARTHUR'S representational scheme is based on that of Schank
and Abelson [1977], including Conceptual Dependency
representations for actions, script representations for
stereotypical sequences of actions, and goal and plan
representations for desired states and intended methods of
achieving those states.
3.2 Annotated run-time output from ARTHUR
The following represents actual annotated run-time
output of the ARTHUR program. The input to the program is
the "swat fly" story given above;
[5] Mary picked up a magazine. She swatted a fly.
The first sentence causes ARTHUR to generate the plausible
inference that Mary plans to read the magazine for
entertainment, since that is stored in ARTHUR'S memory as
the default use for a magazine. ARTHUR'S internal
representation of this situation consists of an "explanation
triple": a goal (being entertained), an event (picking up
the magazine), and an inferential path connecting the event
and goal (reading the magazine). The following ARTHUR
output is generated from the processing of the second
23
sentence.
:CURRENT EXPLANATION-GRAPH;
GOAL: (E-ENTERTAIN (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT MAG))
EVO: (GRASP (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAG))
PATHO: (READ (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT MAG))
ARTHUR'S explanation of the first sentence has a goal
(being ENTERTAINed), art act (GRASPing a magazine) and
an inferential path connecting the action and goal
(READing the magazine),
:NEXT SENTENCE CD:
(PROPEL (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT NIL) (TO FLY))
The Conceptual Dependency for Mary's action: she
struck a fly with an unknown object.
:FAILURE TO CONNECT TO EXISTING GOAL CONTEXT:
ARTHUR'S initial goal inference (Mary planned to
entertain herself by reading the magazine) fails to
explain her action of swatting a fly.
:SUPPLANTING WITH NEW PLAUSIBLE GOAL CONTEXT:
(PHYS-STATE (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT MAG) (VAL -10))
ARTHUR now generates an alternative goal on the basis
of Mary's new action: she may want to destroy the fly,
i.e., want its physical state to be -10. This new goal
also serves to explain her previous action (getting a
magazine) as a precondition to the action of swatting
the fly, once ARTHUR infers that the magazine was the
INSTRument in Mary's plan to damage the fly.
:FINAL EXPLANATION-TRIPLE:
GOALl: (PHYS-STATE
(PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT FLY) (VAL -10))
EVl: (GRASP (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAG))
PATHl: (DELTA-CONTROL (PLANNER MARY) (OBJECT MAG)
EV2: (PROPEL (ACTOR MARY) (OBJECT MAG) (TO FLY))
PATH2: (CHANGE-PHYS-STATE (PLANNER MARY)
(OBJECT FLY) (DIRECTION NEG) (INSTR MAG))
II
I
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This representation says that Mary wanted to destroy a
fly (GOALl), so she planned to damage it (PATH2), Her
first step in doing so was to get an instrumental
object (PATHl). These two plans were realized (EVents
1,2) -by her picking up a magazine and hitting the fly
with it.
sREADY FOR QUESTIONS;
>Why did Mary pick up a magazine?
AT FIRST I THOUGHT IT WAS BECAUSE SHE WANTED TO
READ IT, BUT ACTUALLY IT'S BECAUSE SHE WANTED TO
USE IT TO GET RID OF A FLY.
The question asks for the inferred goal under- lying
Mary's action of GRASPing the magazine. This answer is
generated according to ARTHUR'S supplanted inference
about the action (READ) and the active inference about
the action (CHANGE-PHYS-STATE). The English generation
mechanism used is described in Granger [1980].
3.3 MACARTHUR constructs alternative interpretations
MACARTHUR (Granger [1981]) has all of ARTHUR'S
inference abilities and more: it can construct a series of
alternative interpretations of a text when it is led to
doubt its initial inferences by being re—questioned.
MACARTHUR uses knowledge of interpretation shapes described
above to "re-shape" its initial interpretation of a text.
In particular, MACARTHUR has knowledge suggesting a goal
interpretation for a particular action in the context of a
particular "shape". Table [5] illustrates some of the
default goals that MACARTHUR will infer given particular
actions and shapes.
I(PTRANS
(ACTOR Z)
(OBJ Z)
(TO X)
(FROM Y))
(ATRANS
(ACTOR Z)
(OBJ X)
(TO Y)
(FROM Z))
(INGEST
(ACTOR Z)
(OBJ X)
(TO Z's
STOMACH))
(PROPEL
(ACTOR Z)
(OBJ X)
(TO Y))
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PURSUE-STATE AVOID-STATE COVER-STORY NON-INTENTIONAL
Z pursuing
function
of LOC(X)
Z wants Y
to pursue
function
of OBJ(X)
Z pursuing
function
of OBJ(X)
Z pursuing
neg-phys-
state of Y
or of X
Z avoiding
function
of LOC(Y)
Z avoiding
function of
OBJ(X)
Z avoiding
neg effects
of lack of
OBJ(X)
Z avoiding
function of
OBJ(X)
Z hiding
secret intg
at LOC(X)
Z hiding
some other
function
of OBJ(X)
Z hiding
some other
function
of OBJ(X)
Z hiding
goal of
DPROX X
to Y
Motor failure; Z
reacting to trouble
with the INSTRUMENT
(e.g. vehicle) of
the PTRANS
Information failure:
Z thinks OBJ(X) is
another object
Information failure;
Z thinks OBJ(X) is
another object
Skill failure:
Z wanted OBJ(X)
to go to LOC(W)
Table 5; Shaping the Interpretation of Events
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For each of these event/shape pairs, examples abound. For
example, the pair <PTRANS/COVER-STORy> corresponds to the
"secret meeting" explanation of story [6]. The pair
<PROPEL/NON-INTENTIONAL> could arise if Z PROPELed X towards
W, but it went to Y instead; (e.g.. Ken hit a shot into the
rough). Z's observed action of PROPELing X to Y might be
inexplicable without reference to some possible "skill
failure" on Z's part. Similarly, the pair
<INGEST/NON-INTENTIONAL> could arise if Z iNGESTed something
that he wouldn't have INGESTed had he known what it was;
e.g., he ate poison disguised as chocolate. One more; the
pair <ATRANS/AVOID-STATE>: Z could have given X to Y not
because he wanted Y to have it particularly, but because he
(Z) wanted NOT to have X, because of some negative
attribute; e.g., X is a TV and it distracts him from his
work, so he wanted to get rid of it. The PURSUE-STATE
explanations correspond mostly to likely default reasons for
the event being explained, e.g. going somewhere (PTRANS)
because you want to make use of some known function of the
location, such as going to a singles bar to meet someone or
going to a store to buy something. Following is some sample
output from MACARTHUR after reading a simplified version of
the above "Pakistani ambassador" story [6].
Q) Why did the ambassador go to Albania?
A) HE WENT ON A VACATION IN ALBANIA AND PAKISTAN.
Q) Try again. Why did he go to Albania?
A) MAYBE HE WANTED TO MEET WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF
ALBANIA, BUT HE WANTED TO KEEP IT A SECRET.
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3.4 Annotated run-time output from MACARTHUR
The following represents actual annotated run-time
output of the MACARTHUR program. The input to the program
is the Conceptual Dependency representation of the following
story;
[7] Dr. Fitzsimmons yawned loudly. He left Carney and
Samuelson and went into the next room. He opened
the refrigerator.
MACARTHUR generates inferences connecting the first two
statements, inferring that Fitzsimmons is tired and may be
about to go to bed. The following MACARTHUR output is
generated from the processing of the third conceptualization
and subsequent questions.
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•.CURRENT EXPLANATION-GRAPH;
GOALO: (S-SLEEP (PLANNER FITZ))
STATED: (TIRED (ACTOR FITZ))
EVO: (INGEST (ACTOR FITZ)
(OBJECT AIR) (MANNER YAWN))
PATHO: (INVOL-REACTION (ACTOR FITZ))
EVl: (PTRANS (ACTOR FITZ) (OBJECT FITZ)
(TO ROOMl) (FROMROOMO))
PCI: (D-PROX (PLANNER FITZ)
(OBJECT FITZ) (TO ROOMl))
PATHl: ($GO-TO-BED (PLANNER FITZ))
MACARTHUR's explanation of the first two statements
consists of an "explanation graph" (Granger [1980a]),
containing a goal (being rested) and two actions (yawn,
change rooms), each of which are connected to the goal
via an inferential path (an involuntary reaction, and
the "go-to-bed" script, a known plan for get- ting
rest). Now the third statement is read.
:NEXT SENTENCE CD:
(PTRANS (ACTOR FITZ) (OBJECT DOOR (PARTOF FRIDGE))
(FROM CLOSED-POS) (TO OPEN-POS))
The Conceptual Dependency for Fitzsimmons* action; he
moved the door to its open position.
:FOUND PLAN EXPLANATION:
(DRINK (PLANNER FITZ) (OBJECT MILK (TEMP WARM)))
CONTROL PRECONDITION IS:
(D-CONT (PLANNER FITZ) (OBJECT MILK) (FROM FRIDGE))
MACARTHUR connects a possible plan for going to bed
(drinking warm milk) with the knowledge that milk is a
food and therefore may be in the fridge. MACARTHUR now
re-explains the previous action of changing rooms in
terms of this plan of drinking warm milk.
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PROXIMITY PRECONDTION IS;
(D-PROX (PLANNER FITZ) (OBJECT FITZ) (TO ROOMl))
:EXPLANATION COMPLETE:
:SHAPE IS.PURSUE-DESIRED-STATE:
:READY FOR QUESTIONS:
Q) Why did Fitzsimmons open the refrigerator?
A) BECAUSE HE WANTED TO GET SOME MILK FROM IT SO
HE COULD DRINK SOME WARM MILK SO HE COULD GET
SOME REST.
MACARTHUR generates an answer to the question by using
its current explanation-graph to find the goal for this
action. It also mentions the intermediate inferences
in the connective chain from event to goal.
(MACARTHUR's English generation algorithm is taken from
ARTHUR'S, described in Granger [1980a].)
Now the same question will be asked again, causing
MACARTHUR to re-evaluate its explanation.
Q) Are you sure?
Why did Fitzsimmons open the refrigerator?
:RE-PROCESSING AND RE-SHAPING EXPLANATION:
:NEW SHAPE IS AVOID-UNDESIRED-STATE:
(TIRED (ACTOR FITZ)) IS UNDESIRED STATE
:GENERATING NEW GOAL EXPLANATION:
GOAL: (P-AWAKE (PLANNER FITZ))
:ATTEMPTING TO SUPPLANT EXPLANATION:
MACARTHUR uses its classification of explanations into
shapes (see section 3.2) to generate an alternative
goal, that Fitzsimmons wants to stay awake, i.e., to
avoid sleeping. It then attempts to re-explain the
events of the story in terms of this new goal, thereby
supplanting the previous goal explanation. This
requires MACARTHUR to find connections between the
story events and the new goal.
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;FOUND PLAN EXPLANATION;
(DRINK (PLANNER FITZ) (OBJECT COKE))
CONTROL PRECONDITION IS:
(D-CONT (PLANNER FITZ) (OBJECT COKE) (FROM FRIDGE))
PROXIMITY'PRECONDTION IS:
(D-PROX (PLANNER FITZ) (OBJECT FITZ) (TO ROOMl))
MACARTHUR has found a connective explanation: a known
plan for avoiding sleep is to drink coke, and coke is
food, so it may be found in the refrigerator, so going
to the fridge and opening it can be interpreted as
satisfying the preconditions of getting to the coke and
getting hold of it in order to drink it.
:EXPLANATION COMPLETE:
:SHAPE IS AVOID-UNDESIRED-STATE:
:RE-RESPONDING TO PREVIOUS QUESTION:
Why did Fitzsimmons open the refrigerator? '
A) AT FIRST I THOUGHT IT WAS BECAUSE HE WANTED TO
GET SOME MILK FROM IT SO HE COULD DRINK SOME WARM
MILK SO HE COULD GET SOME REST, BUT ACTUALLY IT
MIGHT BE BECAUSE HE WANTED TO GET SOME COFFEE
FROM IT SO HE COULD DRINK SOME COFFEE SO HE COULD
STAY AWAKE.
MACARTHUR's final answer expresses both its supplanted
initial explanation ("At first I thought ..."), that he
might have intended to go to sleep because he was
tired, along with its new explanation ("but actually
...") that his reaction to the state of being tired
might have been to try to avoid going to sleep.
(See Granger [1981J and Schulenburg [1982] for a more
complete discussion of MACARTHUR.)
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4.0 Additional Categories of Inference Decisions
4.1 "Suspicious" understanding
It is often impossible for an understander to identify
the "correct" interpretation shape for an actor's behavior.
For instance, consider the following version of a story that
was on the front page of a number of national newspapers
earlier this year:
[8] A report by the New York State Racing and Wagering
Board released today states unequivocally that leading
jockeys conspired to "fix" at least 13 races in the
mid^l970's, and that the jockeys have been "patently
unbelievable" in denying their involvement in the
scheme.
Understanding [8] requires the recognition that the
observed behavior of jockeys can be very difficult to
classify as either "accidental" or "deceptive". Hence, a
jockey (or a jai-alai player, boxer, etc.) may lose a
competition without an observer's being able to tell whether
he did it intentionally or accidentally.
These are special cases of the general problem of
detecting deceptive behavior by using knowledge of "cover
stories". Some recent work in AI (e.g., Bruce and Newman
[1978]) has pointed out that a method of maintaining
separate "belief spaces" for different actors is crucial for
understanding deception. However, understanding deception
can also require a great deal more than this; in
Particular, a more subtle deceiver will typically try to
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cause observers to infer for themselves some false
interpretation of his actions, thereby covering up the real
reasons, -Political propaganda (such as falsely explaining
the reasons for some military action), advertisements for
products (falsely associating the use of a product with some
desired outcome), and face-saving "white lies" (covering up
potentially embarrassing reasons for your behavior) are all
examples of this kind of deception. The ability to
understand (and generate) complex deceptive behavior such as
this depends not only on separate belief spaces, but also on
the ability to construct plausible alterative explanations
for events. The more plausible the alternative explanation,
the more likely the deception is to succeed in misleading
understanders.
A "suspicious" understander is one who can (at least)
construct alternative interpretations of events, and then
can attempt to decide among them, typically by gathering
additional information. (Such information-gathering is
based on finding a possible motive. i.e., finding a
plausible explanation that the "obvious" explanation is
intended to cover. The JUDGE program, currently under
construction, is being designed to make use of knowledge of
the shapes of alternative interpretations to detect
plausible coyer stories in the domain of criminal
investigation.
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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4.2 Cover stories
The theory of cover stories is based on two premises;
first, that people often generate plausible default
inferences during understanding, even though those
inferences may turn out to be incorrect; and second, that
presenting appropriate "clues" or facts to understanders can
cause them to make false inferences, even when they're not
directly lied to. For instance, if John rubs his stomach
and licks his lips, and then goes to the kitchen, Mary (if
she's watching) is very likely to make the appropriate
inference that he's going there to get some food. However,
if John actually has some other reason for going in there,
say, to make a private phone call, he may want to cause Mary
to make an inference about his hunger. To do this, he need
only go through the above scenario, and Mary will infer he's
hungry. Hence, John has fooled Mary by using his knowledge
Ql typjgfll default inferences to act out a scenario from
which he knows an observer is most likely to infer a
particular default conclusion, even when that conclusion is
not the correct one.
The theory of cover stories deals with precisely this
issue of how an actor can construct a scenario or make a
statement in such a way that there are two or more possible
interpretations of the actions or statements, and
furthermore that the real motivation for the action, the one
the actor wants hidden, is not the one that is the most
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likely default interpretation, in this way a cover story
can mislead a casual understander into inferring the wrong
one of several alternative interpretations.
The other side of this issue is that an astute or
suspicious understander can search harder through the space
of possible interpretations, looking for possible hidden
ones that he might otherwise have missed. At one extreme,
this ability resembles paranoid behavior, with the
understander constantly searching for hidden meanings
underlying even the most innocent statements or actions,
»
(Note that our intention here is not at all the same as
Colby's [1973] model of paranoid behavior. Our intention is
not to simulate a form of behavior, but rather to uncover
the mechanisms, such as re-shaping interpretations, that
might underlie such behavior in an understander,)
Putting this extreme case aside, however, it is clear
that some understanding tasks require this type of suspicion
by the reader: e.g., understanding political propaganda,
and seeing through to why the statements were really issued;
understanding advertisements, looking for the implications
the advertiser inserts to mislead the understander without
actually lying; attempting tb solve a mystery such as a
crime that has been committed, sifting through possibly
misleading statements or testimony by suspects involved in
the crime.
II
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4.3 Natural subcategories of cover stories
Cover stories are composed of a "false" interpretation
concealing the "true" interpretation or true motive for the
behavior described. Both the false and true interpretations
will have a particular "shape", as described earlier (e.g.,
pursue-desired-state, avoid-undesired-state,
interruption-reaction, skill-failure accident, etc.) We have
noticed that particular combinations of the shapes of the
two interpretations comprising a cover story have certain
identifiable natures. For instance, consider the following
situation:
Fred is a car salesman, trying to sell a car to
Joe. Fred tells Joe that he feels friendly
towards him, and that he's therefore giving him an
especially good car for a better price than
normal. Joe infers that Fred is simply hustling
him.
Joe presumably possesses the societal knowledge that car
salesmen may lie in order to sell cars. Hence he suspects
that Fred may not be telling the truth about either the
merits of this car, nor about his apparent friendly feelings
for Joe. Rather, Fred may be constructing a cover story
(i.e., that he wants to do Joe a good turn) to hide his
simple pursuit goal of making a commission from the sale of
a car.
Contrast this with the following example:
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Prof. Cooper tells his colleague Bernstein that he
is looking forward to relaxing this summer and
getting a much-needed rest. Bernstein immediately
infers that Cooper didn't get the research grant
that.he knew Cooper had applied for.
In this situation Cooper has evidently constructed a cover
story in which he appears to be pursuing a vacation, whereas
actually he is simply re-planning his summer as a reaction
to the unplanned-for fact that he now has no summer salary
coming in.
We can differentiate these two cover stories in terms
of the combinations of shapes comprising the cover story.
In the first situation, Fred the salesman is using a
pursuit-based cover story (wanting to do a favor for his
friend Joe) to conceal a pursuit-based underlying motive,
(making a commission on the sale). This type of cover story
consists of "pursuit covering pursuit". Similarly, one
interpretation of the "Pakistani ambassador" story given
earlier was that the ambassador made use of a pursuit-based
cover story of wanting a vacation to conceal a pursuit-based
underlying motive of meeting with the Albanian government.
It seems that the typical motivation behind such cover
stories can be characterized by "premeditated deception" by
the speaker, in service of a hidden web of goals.
In the second situation given above. Cooper uses a
pursuit-based cover story of wanting a vacation to conceal
his interruption-reaction to the presumably unplanned
circumstance of not having a salary. Consider another
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example of this category of cover-story situation;
Mary sees a mouse in her kitchen and promptly hops
up onto a chair. "I wasn't afraid of that silly
mouse", she claims, "I just wanted to reach up to
clean off this spot on the ceiling".
Again, her pronouncement has the shape of pursuit (cleaning
the spot) covering an interruption-reaction to the unplanned
circumstance of seeing the mouse. These cover stories seem
to have the property of "saving face" for the speaker, i.e.,
keeping the speaker from the embarrassment of admitting to
the actual reason for his actions.
Other permutations of simple shapes combined to create
cover stories give rise to subtly different categories of
motivations for an actor to create a cover story.
We hope this line of research will lead us to a more
complete theory of how understanders reconstruct
interpretations of episodes, and how a storyteller or
reporter can construct cover stories to conceal the real
intentions underlying an episode. This research has
possible applications in understanding and analyzing
potentially misleading texts such as political reports and
advertising messages, as well as in making deeper and more
discriminating readings of other non-straightforward texts,
and in constructing interpretations of observed episodes.
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4.4 Understanding accidents
In the attempt to attribute intentions to actors on the
basis of their actions^ an understander will often confront
an action which seems inexplicable when regarded as
intentional behavior. Sometimes (as discussed in the
previous section) this can be a clue that the actor has been
acting out a cover story, in which case re-interpreting his
previous actions in light of this new information may lead
to discovery of his true motives. However, sometimes
actions are inexplicable in terms of intentionality because
they are either accidental or are immediate (and poorly
planned) responses to some unforeseen contingency. Our
initial investigation has led us to hypothesize four
categories of accidents that can occur in an actor's plan.
We call these classes sMU failures, information failures.
system failures and planning failures. The following
discussion gives examples of all four of these accident
types.
Recall the following:
Ken and Carl were playing golf. Ken hit a shot
into the rough.
As discussed earlier, if a reader is asked the question "why
did Ken hit a shot into the rough?" after reading this
example, the most likely answer will be that he didn't do it
on purpose at all; it was an accident. If we analyze this
further, we see that Ken's action was probably intentional:
I
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® he did aim the club at the ball and swing in such away as
H to apply force to the ball. Hence, he must have had a goal
in so doing; we infer that it was to get the ball closer to
the hole, so as to get there in the fewest possible strokes,
in hopes of getting a good score in the game. However, the
causal result of her intentional action did not turn out the
way she intended: the ball went in a different direction
than we infer that she wanted it to go. Recognizing
possible skill failures such as this one is a necessary part
of understanding actions by intentional actors.
Other types of failures can occur in the performance of
an action intended to have a particular causal result; for
example, consider:
[9] John was looking for some cereal, and he accidentally
ate a bowl of rat poison flakes instead. He got very
very sick.
We infer from this example that John didn't intend to get
sick, but he did, of course, intentionally perform the
actions involved in eating the rat poison. The problem here
is that John didn't know the fact that the stuff he was
eating was poison; the accidental outcome of this action
was due to an information failure.
The third class of accidents we have looked at can be
illustrated by the following example:
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John was driving up to Oxnard to visit his
girlfriend. He got a flat tire when he Was about
halfway there.
This accident is classified as a "system failure". i.e., a
problem with some instrument the planner is counting on to
achieve his plan. Other examples of this category of
accident include problems with the postal service, damaged
tools, illness, etc.
Finally, the fourth class of accident we have
identified are due to errors that occur at the time an actor
is planning a future episode, not at the time of execution
of the plan. These accidents still go unnoticed until the
time of execution, however. For instance:
Jack went to the theater to see "Empire". He
realized when he got there that he had forgotten
his wallet.
Jack's problem is clearly attributable to his own
"too-shallow" planning at the time he left his house to go
to the movie theater. He didn't bother to think ahead to
the preconditions of the plan he was about to carry out, and
hence he forgot to fulfill one of the simple preconditions,
namely, having money to pay for his ticket.
Understanding stories involving failures of skill,
information, an instrumental system or sufficient
pre-planning requires the reader to acknowledge the
possibility that an actor's plan might fail. Such a failure
would be represented as a mismatch between the causal result
of an action and the inferred intention in service of which
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the action was performed. Hence, understanding such texts
requires monitoring possible alternate causal results of
actions, in addition to the possible alternate intentions in
service of which the actions might have been performed.
4.5 Re-planning and re-acting
When an accident occurs, a planner will usually respond
by re-planning around the accident and re-acting on the
basis of the new plan. While there exist many planning and
problem-solving systems capable of re-planning, we know of
no systems that can detect or understand accounts of
episodes involving re-planning. For example, recall the
following situation:
John was driving up to Oxnard to visit his
girlfriend. He got a flat tire when he was about
halfway there.
This accident is classified as a "system failure", as
described earlier. John's possible responses include the
following:
1. Resume-plan: John may decide to try to continue his
current plan of driving up to his girlfriend's. For
instance, he may simply keep driving (incidentally
ruining his tire rim).
2. Local-remedy: John may decide to interrupt his plan, to
attend to fixing the problem. E.g., he may replace the
tire with a spare, and then resume his drive.
3. Change-plan: John may decide to abandon his existing
plan and try another one to achieve the goal. E.g., he
may try to hitchhike the rest of the way, or rent
another car, or walk.
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4. Abandon goal; John may decide to give up, and simply
sit by the side of the road waiting for the police to
drive by and rescue him. (Issues in understanding goal
abandonment are discussed in Schank and Abelson [1977].)
In addition to these issues revolving around his
existing plan, John may also have any of the following
responses to the accident:
1, Diagnose: John may try to dig deeper into what went
wrong with his tire,
1. Was it simply worn down? If so, he may make a
mental note to start having regular maintenance
checks on his car.
2. Was there something sharp on the road? If so, he
may try to get rid of the object so that the next
driver's tire won't be punctured by it.
3. Did someone intentionally put a nail in the road?
If so, he may want to find out who and why, to
prevent the person from doing other bad things to
him, and perhaps to exact revenge.
2. Emote: John may sit down in the road and cry, or get
angry and kick the car, etc. Such affective reactions
have been discussed by Lehnert [1980].
5.0 Conclusions: Where we've been, where we're heading
5.1 What we're proposing
We have observed that people's understanding behavior
is marked by an ongoing process of making inference
decisions. Among the decisions understanders implicitly
make are:
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1. Is the interpretation referentially and causally
cohesive?
2, Is the interpretation parsimonious with respect to the
actors* intentions?
3. Is there reason to doubt or be suspicious of the shape
of the initial interpretation?
4, Is there reason enough to revise the interpretation
(supplant, re-shape, etc) or should it be left with
"loose ends"?
The evaluation metrics and the construction and revision
processes of Judgmental Inference theory are derived
directly from our observations and analyses of some of the
classes of inference decisions that readers are faced with
during the task of text understanding.
We view these theories as compatible with and
complementary to theories of text representations, since we
intend to describe the mechanisms by which such
representations are chosen, constructed, judged, confirmed
and/or discarded in the process of understanding. Our
theories have so far been incorporated into two working
computer programs, ARTHUR and MACARTHUR, and are currently
being used as the design impetus for a new computer system
called JUDGE, and for a series of psychological and
neurophysiological experiments, briefly described below, to
test the correspondence of our theories to people's actual
understanding behavior.
II
I
I
I
I
I
44
5.2 MindSf brains and processes
A number of researchers in the neurosciences (e.g.,
Arbib [1979], Geschwind [1980]) have pointed out that brain
research might help guide parts of cognitive science and AI
research, and vice versa. One particular issue that has
been pointed out frequently is that "there is no evidence
I for the existence of any all-purpose computer [in the
brain]. Instead, there seems to be a multiplicity of
systems for highly special tasks." (Geschwind [1980],
p.191). Our research on inference decisions has indeed led
us away from viewing human understanding behavior as arising
I from a "general purpose computer"; we have ended up instead
deriving a number of special-purpose mechanisms, e.g.,
inference pursuit, evaluation, supplanting, re-shaping,
which comprise our judgmental inference model of
understanding.
I
I
I
• We are currently designing a number of psychological
H and neurological experiments on inference decisions, based
on the predictions of our model. We hope to use the data
I from such experiments to find problems with our theories,
and to refine the model, thereby working eventually towards
some small amount of "neurological validity" in our process
models of cognition.
I
I
I
One of the major problems that our theories still have
not adequately addressed is that of differentiating among
III inference decisions that people make unconsciously vs.
I
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those that are consciously noticed. Furthermore, our
initial investigation has shown that there are no simple
rules for conscious vs unconscious inference decisions; in
particular, there appear to be a number of individual
differences among readers — one view is that some readers
consciously notice these decisions more easily than others;
another view is that the readers who do not notice these
decisions are not really making them — rather they are
postponing the decisions by leaving "loose ends" in their
interpretations, and resolving them later on. Hence, our
initial experiments are being designed specifically in an
attempt to shed some light on this problem of conscious vs
unconscious inference decisions. There are also a number of
existing studies on this and related issues in inference
processes during understanding (e.g., Rumelhart [1981],
Crothers [1978], Hillyard and Kutas [1980], Black [1981]).
We hope to re-interpret some of the data from these
experiments in terms of the predictions of our model.
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